issues from newspapers such as Minshengbao, Jingbao, and Chaobao. The study's solid introduction to pre-Guomindang Nanjing is followed by an account of the eight Nationalist mayoralties from April 1927 to November 1937 (two mayors served twice). After this, the book is organized thematically, with a chapter each on refugees, shantytowns, rickshaw pulling, prostitution, and beggary. An epilogue draws comparisons between the Nationalists' makeover of Nanjing in the 1930s and the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP)reconstruction of Beijing as national capital after 1949; Lipkin's aim here is demonstrate some of the significant similarities between GMD and CCP approaches to social deviance in urban contexts.
What did the reformers achieve? One success was the drive to get beggars off the streets and into asylums or labor squads; beggars were less visible in Nanjing's public places by the mid-1930s. Traffic reform failed to reduce rickshaw numbers, but government regulation and welfare provisions went some way towards making the life of the rickshaw coolie a bit more tolerable; the government came to realize that, in the absence of better alternatives, "rickshaw-pullers contributed to the proper functioning of the city" (pp. 159-160). But the municipal government could not build houses fast enough to accommodate the large numbers of refugees who, fairly steadily throughout the decade, streamed into the city and who resisted being relocated to housing estates outside the city walls. As for the 1928 ban on prostitution, it was bad for the government, the tourist industry, and local businesses as well as for prostitutes, and it failed to reduce the number of prostitutes in Nanjing.
It took Chiang Kaishek's New Life Movement (1934) to stymie a relegalization drive that had begun to gather steam in 1932-1933 (pp. 187, 192, 196-199 ).
As we might expect, the reasons for reform failure are complex and numerous. Political naiveté, poor planning, and haste were responsible for early failures.
Inadequate funding constrained all projects throughout the decade. And what Lipkin calls "objective circumstances"-the natural disasters, civil wars, and world depression over which the Nanjing government had no control and which caused the big refugee migrations to Nanjing-must have often made the reform task look hopeless to people on the ground. For Lipkin, another problem was that the vision driving the entire state-building project was not adequately grounded in local realities. The reformers imagined a "modernity" that required altering "minds and hearts"-"spiritual reconstruction" (jingshen jianshe)-transforming former subjects of the emperor into citizens of the nation and turning a "heap of loose sand" into a society (p. 231). They floundered around searching for strategies to achieve this transformation and were too impatient. In the end, they were not given the time needed to turn useless fringe dwellers into productive citizens.
Among the strengths of this impressive study are the resourceful and rigorous research on which it is based and the skillful construction of a history that, until now, has been largely hidden from view. A weakness, in my judgment, is the rather bland core argument that, with little qualification, is repeatedly asserted: that the Nanjing government was driven by a nationalist ideology infused with Western ideas of science, modernity, and social Darwinism (p. 230). Lipkin does look for customs and social norms in the imperial past from which the modernizers might sometimes have drawn. She insists, however, on the essential foreignness of the ideology that underpinned the Nanjing government's reform program, its radical break with the past. In a world in which social Darwinian ideas flourished, Nanjing's modernizers felt compelled to create a capital city "that would compare with the most famous cities of the world" (p. 41). They were unambiguously, uncritically committed to realizing Sun Yatsen's vision. Sun had emphasized the importance of paying homage to China's past, but his vision of modernity, in Lipkin's reading, was essentially Western.
The Nationalist ideology that emerges from Lipkin's analysis is somewhat monochromatic, with little nuance, subtlety, or variation over time. Maybe the Nanjing authorities really were uncomplicated ideologues with a simple commitment to transforming Nanjing into the modern capital imagined by Sun Yatsen back in 1912. Certainly, their strategies and emphases sometimes differed, but these differences do not seem to have diminished in any way the ideological consensus that impelled the social engineering project. Were there differences between the city and central governments? Lipkin occasionally discusses the relationship, but most often to note the inadequate funding provided by the center to the city. Clues to the factional affiliations of each of Nanjing's six mayors in the Nanjing decade are provided in the appendix A biographies. But we are left to assume that there was an unambiguous, common understanding of modernity among Guomindang factions and at all levels of the party hierarchy.
Lipkin ends by making big claims for the Nanjing project. Despite the failure to meet reform objectives by 1937, she says that the "overall Nanjing experiment succeeded, leaving long-lasting effects . . . The goals of material 'modernization' which the Nationalists began promoting during the Nanjing Decade in Nanjing and elsewhere continued to inspire later regimes and irrevocably transformed the Chinese landscape" (p. 229). In support of this claim, she points to the CCP's use of the same "concepts, vocabulary and policies set by the Nationalists during the Nanjing decade, " and asserts that the Communists have built on "the foundation for a new China" built by the Guomindang (p. 231).
Was the CCP really so indebted to the GMD? Certainly, with little experience of urban government, the Communists in the 1950s needed to leave in place any urban institutions and infrastructures that were still functioning and did not grossly offend their nationalist sensibilities (the Communists have always been at least as nationalistic as the Nationalists). But Lipkin gives no consideration to the fact that the Communists, driven out of a "united front" with the GMD in 1927, were engaged in modern state building in rural bases at the same time as the Nationalists were first flexing their state making muscle in cities they administered. The rural and urban settings were, of course, radically different. But the Communists in the 1930s were as obsessed with "national unity" as the Nationalists. They, too, were state strengtheners, intent on pushing deeply into society to exploit local resources and to mobilize people for participation in nation building projects. In the 1930s and 1940s they, too, rounded up itinerants, pushed beggars and refugees into productive employment, freed coolies from exploitation by local bullies, and endeavored to turn all women, not just ex-prostitutes, into productive members of society.
The Nationalists and Communists both belong to the reform tradition that grew out of the nineteenth-century self-strengthening movement and that is alive and well today. By the 1930s, the movement encompassed many political parties and groups that, despite their significant differences, shared a vision of a "wealthy . That Lipkin finds the post-Mao, more than the Maoist, approach to social problems very similar to that of the Nationalists in Nanjing is not surprising. Mao's opponents within the CCP were the people closer to the Nationalists in the two GMD-CCP united fronts (1927-1937 and 1937-1946) , collaborations with which Mao was always less than comfortable. These people and their protégés, mistrusted by Mao as "bourgeois revisionists, " set the agenda for the new phase of the self-strengthening movement that began at the end of the twentieth century. They had cut their political teeth as colleagues or rivals of the Nationalists, not as followers.
The Nanjing Nationalists belonged to a modernization movement that, in 1927, was at least seventy years old, had a very broad base among educated elites, was far flung, and was energized by debates about, among other things, the extent to which China's modernization should entail Westernization. Lipkin overstates the novelty of the Nanjing reformers' ideas, the breadth and depth of the influence they exerted, and the level of consensus within the Guomindang about a social reform agenda. In sum, the broad generalizations that Zwia Lipkin makes about the origins, originality, and historical significance of GMD state building are, I suggest, contentious and not proven. On the other hand, her finely crafted history of the Guomindang's attempt to enfranchise, by making "productive, " Republican Nanjing's large and ever growing population of marginal people stands as a model of research virtuosity and fine historical scholarship. The study makes a major contribution to the fields of Chinese urban, Republican, and subaltern history. The careful documentation of reform experiments led by a succession of Nanjing may-ors, their many reform failures, and their few successes, helps to give human faces to some GMD bureaucrats. The Nanjing public is also given a say in the direction that the city's regeneration should take. And Lipkin has done her very best to listen to the voices of the city's disenfranchised underclasses. The space that these people are given in the book makes it an exceptional and remarkable publication.
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